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DISCRETIONARY CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.
CHARITABLY

disposed persons, having no definite choice as to

objects, often leave funds by will to an executor or trustee, with

power in him to disposeof the amount to such charitable objects or
purposes as he may think most deserving, or may for any reason
prefer; and the question frequently arises, What becomes of such
a fund? Is the bequest a valid one, or does it devolve upon the
heirs at law or next of kin, as not being sufficiently and legally
disposed of by will?
lirst. It clearly does not *belong to the executor or trustee
himself. He has no personal interest in the legacy. He holds
it merely as trustee, although the words "in trust" may not be
used in the will. The whole language imports a trust; and a
court of equity could compel him, if living, to distribute it to
some charities, he of course having the selection. His discretion cannot .be taken away, but he can be compelled to exercise
it. This is practically accomplished by an order of the court
that such trustee report a "scheme for distribution," according
to his own judgment, to be sure, but to be approved by the
court, in order to secure, beyond peradventure, its appropriation
to charitable purposes: Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211;
Schouler, Petitioner, 134 Mass. 426 ; White v. Ditson, 140 Mass.
351; Ommaney v. Butcher, Turn & Russ. 260.
Second. Does it go to the testator's heirs, or will the court
administer it to some charities ?
In England undoubtedly such a fund would be distributed
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to charities. No sum once legally and sufficiently devoted to
"charity" by a testator is ever allowed to reach the heirs under
any possible circumstances. It is established in that country
that by giving it to charity, the owner intended that at all
events his heirs should not have it; that clearly he meant to
take it away from them whatever might become of it; and if,
for any reason, by the rules of law, the exact wishes of the
donor cannot be carried out, the law or equity will find some
other charitable objects on which to bestow it.
This may or may not seem reasonable and just to the American legal mind of the present day, but it is, no doubt, the
established English law.
In some American States such devises, at least where the executor or trustee has only a power, and not a legal interest, are
apparently considered absolutely void, and although the executor
or trustee in good faith selects some proper charitable object
and attempts to exercise the power apparently conferred upon
him by the will, by actually distributing the fund to such objects
as he approves, all such appropriations of the funds are held
illegal, and the heirs of the testator are allowed to recover the
same, either of the executor himself, or from those on whom he
has bestowed it.
In Lepage v. AfoNamara, 5 Iowa, 124 (1857), the devise was
to the testator's widow for life, and at her death "I direct and
authorize the Rt. Rev. Bishop Loras, or his successors, to dispose of my real estate, and apply so much thereof to the church
or to the education or maintenance of poor children, as he in
his wisdom may think proper and legal." After the widow's
death Bishop Loras conveyed by deed a portion of the estate
to the defendants. Held, that they took no title, but that the
heirs at law could recover the same in a real action against the
Bishop's grantees.
In Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242 (1885), a testator gave all
the rest and residue of his estate to certain trustees named, as a
permanent fund, the income of which was to be applied as follows: three-quarters to certain specified charities, and as to the
other quarter the will said, "I authorize, empower, and direct
my wife to permanently dispose of the same for such charitable
purposes as she may deem proper." She did in writing desig-
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nate certain charitable institutions as beneficiaries of the fund.
Hdd, nevertheless, that the bequest was void and went to the
heirs at law as an intestate estate: And Judge Loomis said, p.
256: "Whatever might be held by the courts of England, or
of those States which have adopted the English doctrine on
this subject, it is very clear that under our own decisions, which
have established a definite rule on the subject in this State, this
bequest cannot be held valid. It is well established with us that
a gift to a charitable use must designate the particular charitable
use by making the gift to some charitable corporation whose charter provides for a charitable use of its funds, or to some particular object or purpose that the law recognizes as charitable. It is
enough if the object be mentioned, and the law can see that it
is a charitable one; but it is not enough that the gift be merely
'to charitable uses' or ' to be used in charity,' so long as no
selection is made from the long list of recognized charitable
objects. And it is not enough that some person is named to
whom is given the power of naming the charity. That is the
testator's own matter. It is his intent that is to determine that.
If he chooses to leave the matter wholly to the discretion of some
person named, he can do so by making the gift to him, leaving
him to use his discretion as to the disposition of it. In this ease
the donee takes absolutely, and the law does not trouble itself as
to whether he acts conscientiously in the matter. The testator
has chosen to leave the matter to uncertainty, and there the law
leaves it. The charitable object, thus required to be named,
may be a benefit to a class of persons and therefore uncertain as
to the particular persons of the class that are to receive the
benefit. This uncertainty may make the bequest void, unless
there is a power given to some person or corporation to make a
selection of the individuals: White v. Yzsk, 22 Conn. 50; Adye
v. Smith, 44 Id. 70; Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Id. 513; Coit v.
Cbmstock, 51 Id. 379; Tappan's Appeal from probate, 52 Id.
412. Here the power given the widow is not to select the particular beneficiaries of a class named, but to select the charity
itself. We think that to uphold this bequest, we should have
to go beyond the utmost limit to which we have gone in upholding charitable gifts. The bequest being of such a character, it clearly cannot be saved by the act of the widow in mak-
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ing a written designation of the charitable purposes which by
it she is authorized to select."
Other States, where the English law of charities is more
fully adopted, hold such bequests, though indefinite, not illegal,
and if the executor or trustee, in his lifetime, duly selects certain charitable objects and transfers the property to them, they
take an indefeasible and perfect title, and the heirs at law of
the testator have no claim either against the executor for such
disposition of the estate, or the recipients of the bounty: Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Penn. St. 465.
But suppose the executor or trustee dies without ever having
made any selection or designation of any charitable object or
purpose, what becomes of the legacy then? Does it in such
event revert to the heirs or next of kin of the testator, or can it
be by some other power still applied to charitable objects to
be otherwise selected or designated ? No doubt in England
this can be done, since, as we have before stated, no gift intended
for charity is there ever allowed to fail. Whether the same
rule prevails in America may depend, in part at least, upon the
answer to another question, viz. : Is this done in England by
a Courtof Equityin its ordinary capacityas a Court of Chancery,
or does the Lord Chancellor, on behalf of the Crown, as Parens
Patrie, seize and hold it, as the general constitutional trustee
for all charities, and distribute it according to the order and
direction of the sovereign as he by his sign manual may direct?
If the latter be the English method, it is quite certain that in
America the legacy would go to the heirs of the testator, since
no court in America has this prerogative power. It is not a
judicial power at all, but wholly a ministerial one.
To be sure, the Chancellor in England makes his order for such
distribution, but it is only because he is the keeper of the King's
conscience, and his mouth-piece, as it were, for this purpose, and
the King himself, by his proper officer, sends his letters missive
to the court, indicating how it should be distributed. That our
courts do not possess this extraordinary power is universally
agreed, whatever other differences exist in regard to the law of
charities in the different States. See Fontainv. Ravenel, 17 how.
369; J ckson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 576, Gray, J.; Dickson v.
Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 230;
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L age v. MNamara, 5 Iowa, 146 ; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana,
366.
This carries us back to the question, when does an English
court administer a charitable legacy, by virtue only of its extraordinary power, on behalf of the Crown, and not as a Court of
Equity merely? In five well marked classes of cases:
1. Where the gift is for some illegal object.
2. When the specific charitable object mentioned in the will
is not in existence.
3. Where the bequest is positively declined.
4. Where the legacy is wholly indefinite, and the will provides
no means of making it definite.
5. When the will is in terms indefinite, but points out some
means of making it definite, which means wholly fail before the
evenb takes place.
1. When the gift is for some unlawful purpose.
This will best appear from a few illustrations. Thus in Rex
v. Lady Portington, 1 Salk. 162 (1693), the devise was to Lady
Portington, "for the good of the testator's sodl." It was held
to be void, as being for a "superstitious use;" but that the
legacy should not go to the heirs, since "the King shall order
it to be applied to a proper use." In Da Costa v. De Pas, 1
Ambl. 228; 2 Swanst. 489, note; 1 Dick. 258; 2 Ambl. 712,
a legacy of 1,200 pounds was given to establish a "Jeuba," or
assembly for reading the Jewish law and educating people in
the Jewish religion.- This was also declared to be, at that time,
illegal, and was disposed of by the Crown, 1,000 pounds of it
being given to the Foundling Hospital in London. In Isaac v.
Gompertz, cited in 7 Ves. 61 and Ambl. 228, note, an annuity of
40 pounds a year was given for the support and maintenance of
a Jewish synagogue; which being supposed to be in conflict
with Christianity and therefore illegal, it was ordered by the
court that the Attorney-General "apply to the King for a sign
manual to appoint and direct to what charitable uses said annuity
shall be appropriated." In Cary v. Abbot, 7 Yes. 490 (1802),
before Sir WILLI,-M GRANT, Afaster of the Rolls, a legacy for
educating poor children in the Roman Catholic faith was thought
to be illegal, and was administered under the King's sign manual to other charities. So in Attorney-Generalv. Todd, 1 Keen,
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803 (1836), a devise for the support of a Roman Catholic priest
met with like fate. See, also, ,ims v. Quinla1, 16 Irish Ch. R.
191 (1864). No doubt under or since the enabling acts in
Great Britain, some if not all the aforesaid bequests would now
be held valid and go to the purposes named; and in America,
no doubt, they would be held good without any special statutes on
this subject. For in this country, where no religious denomination, doctrine, or form of worship is forbidden by law, so long
as the public peace is not disturbed, there is no such thing as a
"superstitious use," and bequests of this kind would not for
that reason be invalid. See .1_Fethodist Church v. Remington, 1
Watts, 218; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170; Hughes v. Daly, 49
Conn. 34; ifagill -,. Brown, Brightly, 373; Ex parte Schouler,
134 Mass. 426; Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa, 129.
Second. The second class of cases is where the specific object
of charity stated in the bequest is not in existence or cannot be
identified.
Thus, in Simon v. Barber,Tamlyn, 14 (1829), the legacy was
given "to the Guernsey Hospital, to be applied toward carrying on the charitable designs of said corporation." There was
no hospital by that exact name in the island of Guernsey, though
there were two hospitals of a somewhat similar name; but the
master to whom the case was referred, having reported that he
was unable to determine what hospital the testator meant, the
Master of the Rolls said---" The Guernsey Hospital, the particular charitable object of the testator, has failed, but it remains
with the Crown to signify to what charitable purposes this fund
shall be applied. Whenever a charitable object fails, from whatever cause, the Crown has a right to interfere." Sandford v.
Gibbons, 3 Hare, 195, note (1829), and Thorley v. Byrne, Id.
(1830), are exactly like it. See also Loscombe v. Wintringham,
13 Beav. 87, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 164 (1851).
Third. So, too, where the bequest is declined by the charitable
institution to which it was given. In Denyer v. DruceTamlyn, 32
(1829), 2,000 poundswas given to the University of Oxford, and
40 pounds per annum to another institution, which being declined, Sir JouN LE CH said-" The legacy of 2,000 pounds
and the annual payment of 40 pounds having been refused by the
charitable institutions on which the testatrix conferred them,

DISCRETIONARY CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.

219

those bequests have consequently failed. It results, therefore,
that it rests with the Crown to direct the charitable purposes to
which they shall be applied."
Fourth. When the gift is wholly general, indefinite in its
terms, and points out no specific object or class of objects, and
names no person authorized to select any objects, as of a gift
merely to "charitable purposes."
Thus, in Attorney-General v. _1atthews, 2 Lev. 167 (1675),
the gift was to certain persons, in trust, "for the poor in general, forever." Lord Nottingham held "that the Commissioners of Charitable Uses have nothing to do with it, but it was to
be determined by the King himself in this court, upon an information by the Attorney-General in behalf of the King." And
afterward, "the King directed it should be given to the maintenance of the mathematical scholars in Christ's Hospital."
The same case apparently is reported in Finch, 245, under the
name of Attorney-General v. Peacock. In Clifford v. Francis,
Freem. 330 (1679), the devise was simply "to pious uses," and
the rule is thus stated: "When money is given to a charity
without expressing what charity, then the King is the disposer
of the charity, and a bill ought to be preferred in the AttorneyGeneral's name for that purpose; but if the charity be expressed, then it is in the power of the Commissioners for Charitable Uses." In Attorney-Generalv. Baxter, 1 Vern. 247 (1648),
the gift was of 600 pounds to John Baxter, the author of the
Saints' Rest, to be distributed by him amongst sixty pious
ejected ministers. Oa account of the vagueness and generality
of the gift, the King, on the information of the Attorney-General, ordered it to be given to Chelsea College. Although this
decree was .ilerward reversed in 2 Vern. 105, on the ground
that Mr. Baxter had the power to select the ministers and so
it could be made certain, and was therefore valid, yet the principle that the Crown had ihe sole power of distributing general
legacies was not impugned. In Attorney-General v. Herick, 2
Ambl. 712 (1772), the devise was to the defendant Herrick and
others; upon trust, to be applied to "charitable and pious uses."
The Lord Chancellor (APSLEY) said, "There is no objection to
the uncertainty of the object, for the King may appoint," and
he added, "that he had concluded to apply to his Majesty, as
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Lord Nottingham did in Attorney-General v. Peacock." And
this was done and a decree made accordingly. In Mare v.
Attorney-General, 3 Hare, 195, note (1824), the testator devised
all the rest and residue "to the poor." Declaration that the
residue ought to be disposed of in charity, "a his Majesty shall
be pleased to direct," and decree was made "that it be transferred and paid to such person or persons as his Majesty by
royal sign manual should be pleased to appoint. One of the
most recent and interesting cases under this head is that of Kane
v. Cosgrave, 10 Irish R. Eq. 211 (1876). Peter Doyle by his
will left 1,400 pounds "all to be given for charitable _purposes,"
but clothed no one with the power of selection. His executor filed
a bill for the administration of assets, and suggested a scheme
for its distribution. The court declared they could not distribute a fund bequeathed for charitable purposes generally, or
approve of a scheme respecting it, unless authorized to do so by
letters missive under the sign manual. And the mode of obtaining such royal assent, and the exact form of the letters missive in such cases, is fully set out in the report. This is a very
instructive case, and seems to render unnecessary any further
discussion of this branch of the subject.
Having thus laid the foundation we come directly to the
question, what is the effect of the executors or trustee's death,
without having selected any objects of charity? Let us consider
the cases which bear immediately upon the proposition thus
involved.
Fifth. Where the gift is general in its own terms, but points
out some mode by which specific objects may be selected, as by
giving a discretion to some person or persons, and such mode of
selection entirely fails. Here also the English Courts do not
supply the missing discretion by distributing the fund upon a
scheme of their own, but turn over the fund to the King to be
appropriated under his sign manual. It may be the line has
not always been drawn distinctly, for whether the fund is distributed by the court or by the Crown, the result is the same to
the heirs, and the mode of distribution is unimportant; and the
main question often discussed, is whether the fund goes to
charity or to the heirs, and if to the former, the mode or manner
of the distribution is not much, if at all, considered. But the
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general drift of the cases is plain. Let us consider a few of
them.
In Attorney-General v. Syderfen, 1 Vern. 224, cited in 7 Yes.
43 note (1683), the bequest was of one thousand pounds, "to
be applied to such charitable uses as he (the testator) had by
writing under his hand formerly appuinted." After the testator's
death, no such writing could be found.
The Ld.Keeper, GUILFORD, said, "It is no question but the
charity being now general and indefinite (this writing not being
found) the application of this money is now in the King."
And by his order, it was given to the mathematical boys in
Christ's Hospital. The same principle was involved in the subsequent case of Attorney-Generalv. Berryman, Dick. 168 (1755)
in which C. by will gave five hundred pouuds "to be disposed
of in charity at the discretion of Dr. Berryman." Dr. Berryman never disposed of any of the fund in his lifetime, but at
his death, directed in his will that his brother, the defendant,
should dispose of it at his discretion. The executor of the testator filed a bill for instructions to know whether he could safely
pay over the money to the defendant. Ld. HAD-wicKE, the
most consummate equity judge that ever sat in an English Court
of Chancery, held the legacy to be a good and subsisting legacy
for charity; "but as Dr. Berryman had not executed the trust
reposed in him, it rested witl the Crown, and therefore recommended it to the parties to apply to his Majesty to dispose of
the legacy." This was done and the legacy distributed accordingly. This seems to be a direct answer to the question under
consideration, and has never been doubted, so far as our researches extend. In Attorney- General v. Fletcher, 5 Law J.
Ch.(N. S.) 75 (1835), the testatrix bequeathed "the rest and
residue of her estate to her sister Ann, but the principal and
interest of several annuities as they fell in, she gave to charitable purposes which should thereafter be specified, or in default
of which, according to the best judgment of the Rev. Dr. John
Maddy, the sole executor of her last will." The testatrix died
without having specified any charitable purposes, and Dr.
Maddy renounced probate of the will and declined the trusts,
but proposed to nominate the charitable objects of the bequest.
Hdd,that he could not do so, but that "the disposition was not
VoL. XXXVI--29
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by a scheme, but it ought to be disposed of in charity, in such a
manner as the King, by sign manual might direct." So in Re
Dickason, 3 Hare, 195, note (1837), there was a bequest "to ten
such charities as the testator should name, one hundred pounds
to each. If he should not name them, then the executors to
make the disposition." The testator did not name any charity
and the executors declined to act. It was ordered that the executors pay the residue of one thousand pounds "to such persons as her Majesty should by sign manual appoint for the use
of such charities, and in such proportions, as her Majesty should
under her royal sign manual appoint."
A comparatively recent case in Ireland illustrates the English
law in the class of charities we are now considering with great
distinctness. There a testator bequeathed his estate "to William Russell to be by him applied for such pious purposes and
uses as should appear to him most conducive to the honor and
glory of God, and the salvation of my soul." Upon argument,
the bequest was held valid in its nature as a charitable bequest,
and by consent of the trustee it was referred to a Remembrancer
to report a scheme of distribution, but before he made a report,
the trustee died. The court decided that although they had
thus far acted as a Court of Equity by consent of the trustee,
yet ihat his death entirely changed the case, and that after his
death, the distribution of the charity belonged to the Crown:
Felan v. Russell, 4 Irish Eq. R. 701 ; Longf. & Towns. 674
(1842). The argument is better reported by the first reporter,
the judgment by the latter. The case is also mch in point
upon the case supposed. Here the trustee having the discretionary power of selection, died before his scheme of distribution
was fully settled upon; in the case supposed, lie dies before any
plan is attempted. The result reached in these cases cited under
this fifth head, seems to be a logical consequence from the rule
so well established by the cases cited under the fourth head. For
what practical difference can there be, between a bequest absolutely indefinite in the first instance, and one which becomes so
by matter ex post facto, and before any action taken to carry the
bequest into effect? In Moggridge v. Thackwdl, 7 Ves. 83
(1802), Ld. ELDON declared that it was "very difficult to raise
a solid distinction between them." Mfight he not have used
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still stronger language? If a legacy is given "to A. B. for
charitable purposes" and stops there, without doubt an English
court could administer it only under the sign manual. But if
it be to A. B. for such charitable purposes as he may select,
and A. B. dies before he sees fit to dispose of any of the fund,
the additional clause becomes entirely inoperative and impossible, and the same indefiniteness now arises by the death of A.
B. as would have existed had he never been named as trustee,
or never had any discretion given him to distribute the fund.
We may reach the same result by a somewhat different path.
It seems obvious that the language used by the testator in the
supposed case indicates a personal trust and confidence in the
discretion of A. B. Now it is a well settled principle of the
law of trusts, that if a gift is dependent upon the discretion of
one trustee, it does not devolve upon another, though a successor
in the trust. In Hibbardv. Lamb, 1 Ambl. 309 (1755), E.
B. by will gave the residue of her estate "to be disposed of in
charity to such persons, and in such manner as her (four) executors, or the survivors of them, should think fit." Two of the
trustees died, and on a bill to appoint two successors, Ld.
HARDDWIOKE made the appointment, but he said--" The new
trustees could not dispose of the residue in charity, for as the
testator had conferred that power upon her executors only, the
court could not give it to the new trustees."
Of course, if the discretion had been vested in A. B. and his
successors, then the rule is entirely different. Then the mode
of selection is not exhausted by the death of the first trustee.
The testator has provided an endless chain. This was the point
of the decision in Lorings v. Marsh, 6 Wall. 337; Paice v.
Archbishop of Canterbury, 14 Ves. 364. But suppose no such
language of perpetuity is found in the will, it means to say, I
give the same to A. B. to be disposed of by him, for such
charitable purposes as he may think proper, and if he does not
think proper to so dispose of it, I do not give it to charity. If
this were distinctly so expressed, unquestionably, even in England, the estate would go to the heirs at law: De Themmines v.
De Bonneval, 5 Russ. 288 (1828). One other test may be suggested. Suppose the executor or trustee named in the will, to
whom a fund is given to be disposed of by him to such charities
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as he may select, should die before the testator and no other is
appointed in his place by the testator, what becomes of the fund
then? Will it go to the heirs at law, or will an English Court
dispose of it in some method to charities? This exact question
was answered in favor of the heirs in the late case of Chianiberlayne v. Brockelt, 41 L. J. Ch. 789 (1872), in which the testator
left a legacy of one hundred pounds to each of several nephews
and nieces, "to be applied by each of them to such charitable
purposes as each may think most advisable." Some of them
died before the testatrix, and the next of kin applied for distribution of such deceased trustee's share among themselves. The
Attorney-General contended that such fund should still be
devoted to charity, but the Master of Rolls said : "The legacies
to such charitable olbjcts as the nephews and nieces shall select,
must be considered as lapsed legacies in cases where the persons
to select died in the testator's lifetime. The legacies were not
given to any particular charity, for then they would be supported; but the charity is to be selected by a person who died
before the will came into operation by the testatrix's death, and
therefore the object of the gift cannot be ascertained."
If we could properly rest here, the question we are now considering would seem to have but one answer, viz.: that courts
of equity, as such, never dispose of such funds. Bat there is a
large class of cases in England which are often relied upon as
establishing a different doctrine from that just advanced, but
when carefully examined we think may be entirely distinguished
from the cases before cited. The most important of them all
is Mfoggridge v. 1hackwell, 7 Ves. 36, befbre Ld. EmDoN in
1802. There the bequest was in these words: " I give all the
rest and residue of my personal estate unto James Vaston, of
Clapton, Middlesex, gentleman, his executors and administrators, desiring him to dispose of the same in such charities as he
shall think fit, recommending poor clergymen of large families
and good characters." Vaston, the trustee, died before the testatrix, but she did not make any new appointment, though aware
of his decease. The rest and. residue amounted to 50,000 pounds,
and upon a bill in equity three questions were elaborately and
ably argued, viz. : (1)Whether the charity had wholly failed,
and so the property wvent to the next of kin; (2) If not,
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whether it should be disposed of by the King under his sign
manual; or (3) Whether it should be distributed according to a
scheme prepared by a master, under the direction of the court.
And Lord ELDON, with many doubts whether he was justified in taking jurisdiction as equity judge, even in that case,
affirmed Lord THURLOW'S decree in the same case made in 1
Ves. 464; 3 Bro. 0. C.517; viz.: that a court of equity, as
such, could carry out the trust by scheme, but it was because,
and solely because, the testator had indicated the kind or class
of persons as the objects of his bounty. Or, as stated in the
case by Lord THURLOW, in 1 Ves. 475, "because the testatrix
has recommended a more particular charity than the general
one," and the decree was made to have particular regard to that
recommendation. This still more clearly appears from the
report in 3 Bro. C. C. 528. There the genu.s and species were
mentioned, but not the individuals. In the case now supposed,
neither the individuals nor the species are indicated; nothing but
the genus, i. e., "charitable purposes." One case seems to fall
on one side of the line, one on the other. And this exact distinction runs through all the cases before and since. Thus in
Attorney-General v. Hickman, 2 Eq. Cas. Ab. 194 (1732), the
charity was administered by the court (Lord KING, Oh.), after
the trustee's death, because the testator had mentioned "nonconformist ministers" as the objects of his bounty, and only
left to the discretion of the trustees "the particular method how
to dispose of it.". s. c. Kel. 34, No. 24. So in White v. 'Mite,
1 Bro. C. C. 12 (1778), where the legacy was "to the Lying-in
Hospital, and if there should be more than one, then to such
of them as his executor should appoint." The testator afterward struck out the name of his executor from his will, and
died without appointing another. Lord THURLOW sent it to a
master to determine to which Lying-in Hospital it should be
paid; but it was because the testator had "named a particular
charity as a residuary legatee," and the only question was
"how the trust should be carried into execution." Precisely
the same feature existed in Hills v. Farmer, 19 Ves. 483 (1815),
better reported in 1 lAfer. 55, viz.: a mention of some particular objects of the bounty. It reads : "The rest and residue of
all my effects, I direct, may be-divided for promoting the gospel
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in foreign parts, and in England in bringing up ministers in
different seminaries, and other charitable purposes as I do intend to name hereafter, after all my worldly property is disposed of to the best advantage." The great question involved
was whether, having mentioned some particular objects, the
fund was to be lost and go to the heirs, merely because the testator said lie intended to mention other charitable purposes, but
did not. The decree was made upon a scheme, "regard being
particularly had to the charitable intentions denoted by the testator, but not so as to confine the bequest to those only." "It
is," said the court, "as if a testator should give his property to
A. and B. and such others as he should name, but never named
any, A. and B. would not lose their part whatever it be." So
in Attorney-General v. Gladstone, 13 Sim. 7 (1842), the bequest
was "to T. R. fifteen thousand pounds, to be by him applied
for the use of Roman Catholic priests in and near London, at
his absolute discretion." And although T. R. died before the
testator, yet the court had no difficulty in disposing of it by a
scheme, because the class of beneficiaries was distinctly pointed
out by the testator, and the discretion was only as to the particular priests and the amount to be paid to each. So in Reere
v. The Attorney-General,3 Hare, 191 (1843), the bequest was to
two named societies, in trust to pay "the house rent of seven or
more country laborers, who could produce from some clergyman
proper certificates of the honesty, sobriety," etc. And although
the societies named as trustees renounced the trust, the court distributed the fund by a scheme, because "in this case (p. 197) the
objects of the trust are pointed out with great minuteness."
See also Ilayter v. Trego, 5 Russ. 113 (1828). So in .1artin v.
Marqham, 14 Sim. 230 (1844), the specific object of the charity
was mentioned, viz.: "The Parish charity schools of this
county." Therefore, the expressed object being held a legal
impossibility, the court had no difficulty, relying upon Moggridge v. Thacklwell, to carry it out by a scheme, "having regard
to the objects specified in the will." So in Copinger v. aclhane,
11 Ir. Eq. N. S.429 (1877), the bequest was to Rt. Rev. Win.
Keane, " to be applied by him in his discretion for such charitable purposes as he may think fit, for the purpose of promoting
the honor and glory of God, and the advancement and benefit
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of the Roman Catholic Religion." The trustee died without
exercising the discretion, inter vivos, but left a will indicating
two specified objects, viz.: the College of Fermoy and the
Cathedral at Queenstown. Held, that because of this specification of objects, the case was taken out of the class of gifts which
required the disposition to be by sign manual, and therefore
might be carried out by a scheme, distinguishing Felan v.
Russell, 4 Ir. Eq. 701. So in Gillan v. Gillan, 1 L. R. Ireland
Oh. Div. 114 (1878), a legacy of "Two hundred pounds to
some orphanage that I may name hereafter," was held good
although the testator died without naming any; because by the
use of the word "orphanage" he bad specified the objects of his
bounty. Just the converse of Attorney-General v. Syderfen,
before stated. Schouler, Petitioner,134 Mass. 426, easily falls
into line under this head, for there was a specific object, viz.:
"masses," etc.; that is masses and other purposes of a like
character.
The reason for this distinction is obvious. Where there is
any intimation by the testator as to the objects of his bounty,
the courts of equity will take jurisdiction, because they consider themselves bound to conform as near as possible to the
wishes of the testator, and this is the meaning of the word cypros, whereas, when the Crown disposes of it, it has the power
to act arbitrarily, without any regard to the supposed wishes of
the testator; and some of the cases show how far removed the
object benefited was from that near the testator's heart. The
doctrine of cy-prs is ajudicialdoctrine, not a ministerial one at
all. And after examining all the cases on the subject, Lord
ELDON, in 7 yes. says: "The general principle thought most
reconcilable to the cases is, that where there is a general indefinite purpose, not fixing itself upon any object, as this in a degree does, the disposition is in the King by sign manual; but
where the execution is to be by a trustee, with general, or some
objects, pointed out, there the court will take administration of
the trust." In that case, there was not only a trustee named,
but some objects or class of objects clearly pointed out, viz.:
"poor clergymen with large families and good characters." No
less than four ear marks to indicate for whom his bounty was
intended. But if a trustee be named, and no objects are pointed
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out, the circle of application is coextensive with the universe.
It might be applied to any one of the ten various classes specified in the Statute of Elizabeth. It might be devoted by the
trustee to any one of the one hundred and one objects of charity
that have occurred under each of these ten classes. It might be
given to private charity or to public institutions, or to beggars
at the door. It is open "to the poor, the hungry, the thirsty, the
naked, the sick, the wounded, and the prisoner." Can such a
charity be judicially administered by any doctrine of cy-prM?
O/-prM means "get as near the intention of the testator as you
can." When would a court of equity know whether they were
anywhere near the intention of the testator? What is there to
get near to ? To enforce such a bequest would be to create a
trust, not to administer it. This is the prerogative of the
Crown: not a judicial act at all; it is a mere ministerial one.
Or as Perry states it (2 Perry on Trusts, § 719): "It is plain
that to divide a fund left to a charity generally, among several
asylums, hospitals, or alms-giving institutions, is not a judicial
act at all; it is a mere ministerial act, to be regulated by no
rules of law, but to be governed by the good sense and sound
discretion of the person who makes the division or distribution."
In O'Leary on Charitable Uses (1874), p. 182-3, he says"There is a good deal of confusion in the books as to when the
Court and when the Crown, is to have the administration of the
fund. One text writer (Boyle) seems to put the case as if it
was the single circumstance of the interposition of a trustee
that made the difference in the mode of administering the property. But I apprehend that this is not the true rule. I think
it appears, upon an examination of the cases, that the Court
does not take the administration of the fund, unless when two
circumstances have concurred, namely a specification (however
vague) of the charitable object, and a nomination of a trustee
by the donor or testator. And if these things do not concur,
the administration of the charitable fund will go to the Crown.
And this is in effect Lord ELDON'S rule." See also 2 Perry on
Trusts, § 729. It would seem therefore, that, even in England,
a court of equity would not administer the fund, if the trustee
in whom the discretion rests, dies without exercising his discre-
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ti(,u, unless there be some objects or class of objects mentioned
by the testator.
How stands the law in America? Uniformly against it.
Fontain v. Rarenel, 17 How. 369. The testator authorized his
executors, or the survivor of them, after his wife's death, "to
dispose of the same (the rest and residue) for the use of such
charitable institutions in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, as
they or he may deem most beneficial to mankind, and so that
part of the colored population in each of the said states shall
partake of the benefits thereof." The wife survived all the
other executors several years, but neither they nor she disposed
of the fund to any such institutions, but she distributed it as
undisposed of property, after the death of her coexecutors.
After her death, the testator's administrator, de bonis non,
brought a bill against her executor for certain charitable soc'hties of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, to recover the property the widow had so disposed of. Held, that even if such
a power to these particular persons, by the testator, could be executed by the Chancellor in England, it could not be by any
court in the United States, and that the court could not take
the fund from the next of kin. And see an elaborate discussion
of the subject in Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198. .Beekman v.
Bonsor, 23 N. Y. 298. The bequest was in these words:
"After the expiration of ten years, or sooner, if my executors
find that there will be sufficient funds, I would wish a public
dispensary, as in New York, on a similar plan, for indigent persons, both sick and lame, to be attended by a physician elected
to the establishment, at their own house., and also daily at the
dispensary; my executors to consult judicious men in Albany,
respecting the same, and funds enough to carry on the building
and yearly expense; and should there be any overplus, my executors within fifteen years may give it to any other charitable
society or societies for relieving the comfortless and indigent
they shall select." The executors renounced the trust. Hdd,
that even if the bequest were valid, if they had carried it out,
yet having renounced the trust it could not be administered by
judicial authoitv, but only by the prerogative power, which did
not exist in New York. A bequest of money to the executors,
to be applied by them "to such charitable societies for indigent
VOL. XXXVI--30
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and respectable persons, especially females and orphans, as they
in their discretion shall think of," was held to fail if the executors renounced the trust and discretion reposed in them. See
also Lepage v. 31-Vmara, 5 Iowa, 124, before stated. So in
Zeisu'ci s v. James, 63 Penn. St. 465 (1870), it was held that
although a devise to indefinite charities may be good, if a trustee be named, clothed with discretionary power to carry out the
general purposes of the testator, yet if such trustee die or resign,
and there is no provision made by the testator for the continuance of the trust, the charity must fail, since the discretion of
the first trustee cannot be assumed by the court, nor reposed in
a trustee of their selection: and .Fontainv. Barenel, 17 How.
369, was fully approved, on p. 469. Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn.
242, is also directly in point. The language of Judge GRAY,
in the exhaustive opinion in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 576,
appears to be in conformity with this view, in which he says:
"The second class of bequests which are disposed of by the
King's sign manual, is of gifts to charity generally, with no
uses specified, no trust interposed, and either no provision for an
appointment, or the power of appointment delegated to particular persons who die without exercising it. Boyle on Charities,
238, 239; Atorney-General v. Ayderfen, 1 Vern. 224; s. c.1
Eq. Cas. Abridge. 96; Atlorney-General v. leleher, 5 Law. J.
(N. S.), Ch. 7,52'
No doubt if the trustee accepts and is still living, a court of
equity could compel him to execute the trust and make a selection,
and would not allow him to keep the fund himself: Bartlett v.
Nye, 4 Met. 378; Tainterv. Clark, 5 Allen, 66. They could order
him to report a scheme as in Cook v. Duckifteld.. 2 Atk. 562;
Pocock v. Attorney-General, 3 Ch. Div. 342, and many other
cases. But they could not remove him and appoint another
trustee to do it, nor do it themselves, upon a scheme suggested
by the Attorney-General. They would have no right to substitute another man's discretion for that of the trustee named,
whether it be that of a new trustee, a master of chancery, an
attorney-general, or the court. It is elementary law that a
power of trust which is purely personal cannot be exercised by
another: Tainter v. (ha rk, 13 Met. 220; Down, v. JTorrall, I
MI. & K. 561. There being, therefore, no method in America

